# 1NC

### Off 1

**The aff should lose because they failed to promote a defense of the federal government increasing energy production, which undermines debate’s deliberative potential.**

**Defending the federal government in the context of the resolution is crucial to prepared debate and clash that leads to energetic debates on both sides.**

**First, there are multiple ways they could engage the state.**

**a. Eliminating restrictions on brownfields provides an avenue to discuss structural racism inherent in energy production**

**Kibel 98**

(Paul Stanton, LLM @ Cal-Berkeley “The urban nexus: Open space, Brownfields, and justice,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 25. 3, Proquest)

Although it is not too difficult a task to describe the reality of urban decline, it is another task altogether to identify and isolate the underlying trigger of this decline. Many different culprits have been proposed, including racism, capitalism, environmental extremism, postindustrialism, technology, drugs, the media, the automobile, the police, the public school system, too much government regulation, and too little government regulation. Is one of the these issues or entities the true cause? Is there a precise cause and effect explanation for why our cities are now subject to such powerful and destructive economic, environmental, and racial pressures?¶ These are important questions, but questions that I will not try to answer in this Essay. Regardless of whether there initially was an underlying trigger, we have reached a point where the various components of urban decline are now **feeding on** and **reinforcing each other**.9 They are all **interconnected contributors** to the downward spiral that has left our urban cores in their current condition.lo Therefore, instead of arguing for or against a particular underlying cause, this Essay will focus on the relation among certain critical components of the urban decline cycle. More specifically, I will assess three particular components: (1) the impact of suburban sprawl and open space conversion on the urban economy and the environment; (2) the impact of environmental hazardous waste liability on the development of urban neighborhoods and the urban economy; and (3) the impact of suburban sprawl and environmental hazardous waste liability on the health conditions and economic welfare of poor, primarily minority, communities living in the urban core. Although my analysis will draw extensively on the experience in the San Francisco Bay Area, this Essay is not city-specific. The Essay addresses issues that are affecting virtually every major U.S. metropolitan area.¶ To be certain, open space loss, abandoned brownfields, and economic inequity are not the only components of the urban decline cycle. However, they are three areas in which **existing law,** especially in terms of land-use zoning and environmental liability, **has played a crucial role**. They therefore are also areas where legal reform potentially **can play a crucial role** in reversing the pattern of urban decline. By providing a useful framework in which to evaluate such reform, this Essay should assist lawyers and other citizens who are working to reclaim our cities as beautiful, vibrant, and just communities.

**b. Environmental justice affs are possible through the discussion of legislative incentives**

**Bullard 08**

(Robert D. Bullard, Ph.D, Environmental Justice Resource Center,Clark Atlanta University, 7/2/08, “Poverty, Pollution, and Environmental Racism: Strategies for Building Healthy and Sustainable Communities,” <http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/PovpolEj.html>)

**The environmental justice movement emerged in response to environmental inequities**, threats to public health, unequal protection, differential enforcement, and disparate treatment received by the poor and people of color. Poverty and environmental degradation are intricately linked and take a heavy toll on billions of people in developing and industrialized countries alike. **Thus, any search for sustainable development must address the root causes of both poverty and pollution and seek solutions to this double threat.** Redefinition of Environmental Protection. The environmental justice movement redefined environmental protection as a basic right. It also emphasized pollution prevention, waste minimization, and cleaner production techniques as strategies to achieve environmental justice for all without regard to race, color, national origin, or income. Many countries have environmental and human laws to protect the health and welfare of its citizens-including racial and ethnic groups and indigenous peoples. However, all communities have not received the same benefits from their application, implementation, and enforcement. Design a Holistic Approach to Environmental Protection. The environmental justice movement has set out clear goals of eliminating unequal enforcement of environmental, civil rights, and public health laws, differential exposure of some populations to harmful chemicals, pesticides, and other toxins in the home, school, neighborhood, and workplace, faulty assumptions in calculating, assessing, and managing risks, discriminatory zoning and land-use practices, and exclusionary policies and practices that limit some individuals and groups from participation in decision making. Many of these problems could be eliminated if existing environmental, health, housing, and civil rights laws were vigorously enforced in a nondiscriminatory way. **Clean and Affordable Energy. Governments should initiate an action program to make available finances and infrastructure to bring clean and affordable and sustainable energy sources to the 2 billion people who lack these energy service by 2012**. Governments should adopt a target increasing the global share of new renewable energy sources to 15% by 2010. Decrease Pesticide Use. Institute protocols and plan to decrease pesticide use, including prohibiting the export of banned or never registered pesticides, implement integrated pest management (IPM), evaluate the hazards posed by pesticide exports, and improve the quality and quantity of information pesticide production, trade and use and publish information in the public record. Reduce Children's Exposure to Neurotoxicants. Abate lead in older housing; complete phase out leaded gasoline; target high-risk children, screening, early detection, treatment; increase allocation of medications that help reduce or remove lead; use new, safe lead removal techniques; and dietary improvements. **Strengthen Legislation and Regulations. A legislative approach may be needed where environmental, health, and worker safety laws and regulations are weak or nonexistent**. However, laws and regulations are only as good as their enforcement. Unequal political power arrangements also have allowed poisons of the rich to be offered as short term economic remedies for poverty.

**c. Workers cooperatives in urban zones is another example**

**Giancatarino 12**

(Anthony, Coordinator for Research and Advocacy, Center for Social Inclusion Community Innovation In Boston, August, http://www.centerforsocialinclusion.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Boston-ESCO-Case-Study.pdf)

**Communities of color have been environmental activists for decades**. These are communities most often victimized by poor environmental planning, regulations, and decision]making. In the last twenty years, communities of color in the Boston area have united and won a Boston]wide plan to run buses on cleaner burning fuel, stopped a diesel fueled power plant from being located across from the only elementary school in the diverse Chelsea neighborhood, and ended illegal dumping of trash and toxic materials in abandoned lots throughout the communities of Roxbury and Dorchester. Communities of color acting as environmental justice advocates have continued to work towards energy improvements by supporting community focused policy development. The Green Communities Act, a statewide policy passed in 2008, opened a new door to social entrepreneurship – applying entrepreneurial strategies to solving social problems for the public good. **Social entrepreneurship is one of the ways communities of color have gone beyond fighting bad decisions to promoting positive solutions**. Forming a Green Justice Coalition, environmental and economic advocates argued, “Small pockets of greening cannot meet this goal [of 80% efficiency]. To transform our energy system on this scale, all communities must have broad and deep engagement of residents and workers.” **With hopes of making this statement a reality, three Coalition members from Boston – Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE), Chinese Progressive Association (CPA), and Boston Workers Alliance (BWA) – formed a partnership**. The three non]profits believed that communities of color would not be fully included in efficiency efforts because almost all the energy service companies responsible for implementing efficiency programs under the Act are not located where people of color live, such as the Roxbury or Dorchester neighborhoods (see: figure 1). From an economic perspective, case study participants further noted that the lack of a local weatherization business may be a reason why many youth of color from the neighborhood, trained for weatherization, have difficulty finding work. Without a local weatherization business, young neighborhood residents who graduated from green training programs must go out of the area to find a job, a challenge for many in Roxbury and Dorchester, where 15% ] 35% of the population does not have access to a car and rely on transit for job opportunities. **To fill these gaps in environmental impact and access to green jobs, the three non]profits are collaborating to create the Boston Energy Service Cooperative** (BESC). BESC would retrofit and weatherize homes of low]income residents. **It would also be a community]owned business employing local men and women and providing them with a democratic, one person/one vote decision]making process**. **This need is significant; especially as unemployment for communities of color was double that of White communities prior to the recession.**

**AND Our standard for a topical aff is that it shouldn’t be unbeatable but rather one that allows an equitable division of ground.**

**AND They will say that we exclude people who don’t like the state but that is an overgeneralization from defending the state in every instance to defending the state about this particular resolution.**

**Second, education about the state is crucial to activism.**

**a. Arguing about what governments *ought* to do is not the same as complicity with the existing order**

**Dower 10**

(Nigel, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, former President of the International Development Ethics Association “Questioning the Questioning of Cosmopolitanism,” in Questioning Cosmopolitanism, p. 14)

Ethical cosmopolitanism does not merely apply to individuals; it is also applied to the state system and to international relations. It is one of three main approaches generally recognized – the other two being realism or international skepticism, and internationalism or the morality of states approach – but we may want to add, as Simon Caney argues, a distinct fourth approach called nationalism.30 Whether or not a cosmopolitan argues for new forms of global governance – we come to that issue later – the cosmopolitan at least wishes to assess how well or badly nation- states and the international system deliver on the goals that the cosmopolitan accepts or advocates. As such the cosmopolitan will tend to advocate better and larger aid programs, more open and generous immigration and refugee policies, stronger mea- sures to deal with environmental problems, reductions in armaments together with the general promotion of peace anywhere, concern about human rights violations elsewhere and appropriate responses to them, and so on. Critics will argue that such an approach is idealistic, inappropriate or dangerous. National governments are not merely entitled but also have a duty to protect and pro- mote the national interest, whether this has to do with strong defenses in an insecure world or protecting the country’s economic interests. The duty of governments is that of trustees and is justified through various kinds of political theory. Particularly in democracies, governments have a duty to do broadly what their electorates expect them to do and that is to protect and promote the interests of their electorates. The duties of governments are also partly to be understood in terms of the commit- ments their countries have made to other countries in the international arena. Pacta sunt servanda is a well-accepted principle: agreements, whether bilateral or through international law, do create a framework of obligation although this framework has nothing to do with cosmopolitan assumptions. So what the cosmopolitan advocates, if it goes beyond these two types of duty, is inappropriate. It is also dangerous, as realists like E. H. Carr argue, because on the whole the world is a more dangerous and unstable place if countries promote ethical agendas in other parts of the world rather than stick to protecting their vital national interests.31 But these considerations do not undermine a cosmopolitan approach to interna- tional relations. What they do is complicate the ethical analysis that is needed. If a cosmopolitan, as most nowadays do, advocates democratic values, then she will welcome, other things being equal, governments being genuinely responsive to the democratic will. If a cosmopolitan accepts the value of promise-keeping and the value of peace and stability that comes from a well functioning international order, then she will welcome, other things being equal, the observance of international agreements and laws. Indeed, if commitments such as those to do with alleviat- ing world poverty (for instance, the 0.7% GNP commitment in the 1970s and the Millennium Development Goals of 2000) were properly honored, and if commit- ments to environmental law and to human rights protection were properly carried out, many of the goals which cosmopolitans hold dear would be much more realized than they generally are in current circumstances. But this does not prevent the cosmopolitan from advocating that more should be done or that things should be done differently. There is no more paradox involved here than what is standardly accepted in regard to democracy. In one sense govern- ments ought to do what their electorates mandate, but this does not prevent **each citizen** advocating policies for governments which are different from what is man- dated. Indeed, if we were unable to have views about what governments **ought to do** other than that they ought to carry out the democratic will, the democratic will would be groundless! What the democratic argument shows is that if a cosmopolitan wants his views to be implemented by governments, then the crucial task is that of persuading sufficient numbers of citizens of his views, and preparing the next gen- eration through **cosmopolitan education**. As for realist arguments like Carr’s, the cosmopolitan does indeed have reason to be cautious about advocating policies that would undermine peace and order. But in fact Carr’s strictures are more directed at the kind of proselytizing cosmopolitanism we considered earlier than one focused on creating the conditions for the general realization of human well-being.

**b. Its key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case.**

**Brown 11**

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest **groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information**. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [**using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments.** By **¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information.** By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. **A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker** (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145**) writes in regard to energy interest groups**: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, **rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries** (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case**, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in** what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called **“legislative subsidy” (**Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that **factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff** (LaPira 2008) and **neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts** (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but **scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given** ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that **groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position**, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

**c. Focus on state based pedagogy is key to combat racism.**

**Themba-Nixon 2k**

Makani, Exec Director of the Praxis Project Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing  [Jul 31, 2000](http://proquest.umi.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=58714&pcid=8092111&SrchMode=3&aid=1). Vol. 3, Iss. 2; pg. 12, proquest

"This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, **policy can be a force for change**-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

**d. Understanding the intersections of social dilemmas is key to democratic reform of racial hierarchies**

**Winant 2k**

(Howard, Temple University “Race and Race Theory” Annual Review of Sociology, 2000, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/Race\_and\_Race\_Theory.html)

To summarize the racial formation approach: (1) It views the meaning of race and the content of racial identities as unstable and politically contested; (2) It understands racial formation as the intersection/conflict of racial "projects" that combine representational/discursive elements with structural/institutional ones; (3) It sees these intersections as iterative sequences of interpretations ("articulations") of the meaning of race that are open to many types of agency, from the individual to the organizational, from the local to the global. If we are to understand the changing significance of race at the end of the 20th century, we must develop a more effective theory of race. The racial formation perspective at least suggests some directions in which such a theory should be pursued. As in the past, racial theory today is shaped by the large-scale sociopolitical processes it is called upon to explain. Employing a racial formation perspective, it is possible to glimpse a pattern in present global racial dynamics. That pattern looks something like the following: in the period during and after WWII an enormous challenge was posed to established systems of rule by racially-defined social movements around the world. Although these movement challenges achieved some great gains and precipitated important reforms in state racial policy, neither the movements nor the reforms could be consolidated. At the end of the century the world as a whole, and various national societies as well, are far from overcoming the tenacious legacies of colonial rule, apartheid, and segregation. All still experience continuing confusion, anxiety, and contention about race. Yet the legacies of epochal struggles for freedom, democracy, and human rights persist as well. Despite the enormous vicissitudes that demarcate and distinguish national conditions, historical developments, roles in the international market, political tendencies, and cultural norms, racial differences often operate as they did in centuries past: as a way of restricting the political influence, not just of racially subordinated groups, but of all those at the bottom end of the system of social stratification. In the contemporary era, racial beliefs and practices have become far more contradictory and complex. The "old world racial order" has not disappeared, but it has been seriously disrupted and changed. The legacy of democratic, racially oriented movements, and anti-colonialist initiatives throughout the world's South, remains a force to be reckoned with. But the incorporative (or if one prefers this term, "hegemonic") effects of decades of reform-oriented state racial policies have had a profound effect as well: they have removed much of the motivation for sustained, anti-racist mobilization. In this unresolved situation, it is unlikely that attempts to address worldwide dilemmas of race and **racism** by ignoring or "transcending" these themes, for example by adopting so-called "colorblind" or "differentialist" policies, will have much effect. In the past the centrality of race deeply determined the economic, political, and cultural configuration of the modern world. Although recent decades have seen a tremendous efflorescence of movements for racial equality and justice, the legacies of centuries of racial oppression have not been overcome. Nor is a vision of racial justice fully worked out. Certainly the idea that such justice has already been largely achieved -- as seen in the "colorblind" paradigm in the US, the "non-racialist" rhetoric of the South African Freedom Charter, the Brazilian rhetoric of "racial democracy," or the emerging "racial differentialism" of the European Union -- remains problematic. Will race ever be "transcended"? Will the world ever "get beyond" race? Probably not. But **the entire world still has a chance of overcoming** the **stratification**, the **hierarchy**, the taken-for-granted **injustice** and **inhumanity** that so often accompanies the "race concept." Like religion or language, race can be accepted as part of the spectrum of the human condition, while it is simultaneously and categorically resisted as a means of stratifying national or global societies. Nothing is more essential in the effort to reinforce **democratic commitments**, not to mention global survival and prosperity, as we enter a new millennium.

**e. Addressing problems created by political institutions is the best way to challenge whiteness**

**Bush 11**

(Melanie, Associate Professor and Chair, Anthropology & Sociology @ Adelphi University, Everyday Forms of Whiteness: Understanding Race in a “Post-Racial” World, p. 235-236)

Carol Geary Schneider, president of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, has been quoted as saying, "**Very few courses in the contemporary undergraduate curriculum directly address democratic principles** and/or aspirations" (Schneider 1999, 9). She further asked where in the curriculum are students engaged about concepts of justice, democracy, equality, opportunity, and liberty and suggested that **these challenging topics belong in general education because they are integral dimensions of American pluralism and must be understood in the context of their historical connections** (Schneider 1999, 9). This engagement is central to the development of civic responsibility and social awareness as a core tenet of higher education. While most of the work on civic engagement does not speak to the issues of involvement in political projects or the world of social movements, the history of democracy in the United States alone and certainly globally is one that situates these activities squarely within the realm of liberal education and civic engagement. This may be avoided out of concern for partisanship, because of a perception that service is good, activism is problematic or is a result of efforts to sustain the status quo. **Regardless of the reason, it is important to note the significant value that comes from political involvement especially aimed not only on raising awareness or affecting individuals, but also toward structural change** (Bush and Little 2009). **Learning about political institutions,** issues, contexts, and practices **should be an integral part** of that enterprise (liberal arts education). **College graduates cannot make sense of their environment and their place in it if they are politically ignorant, unskilled, and lacking in a sense of civic agency, the sense that they can work with others to solve problems that concern them—in their communities, workplaces,** .. ." (Colby 2008: 8 ) Overall, every opportunity to advance a broad-based and deepened understanding about the global dynamics of white supremacy, including its material impact on the lives of all people, should be pursued. **This effort could** cultivate a counter narrative that deals with white racism from "cradle to grave."29 It can also **provide incentive to** the large numbers of **white people** outside the ruling class, whose acceptance of the status quo contributes to the entrenchment of the patterns of racial inequality and injustice that threaten our future, **to perhaps redefine their allegiances** and reconfigure their notion of "who's to blame."

**Third, predictable limits are good.**

**a. Switch side debate over environmental issues is critical to effective deliberation**

**Mitchell 10**

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. **Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment**. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, **the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism**," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "**we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power**, influence, and bargaining, **to the exclusion of debate** and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving **Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates** covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, **in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution**, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, **and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes** as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. **In the first debate** on interstate river pollution, the **team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest** University **argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State** University **team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition**. In the second debate **on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes** on bottled water and toilet paper, **while** their **opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal**. Reflecting on the project, **Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate** [End Page 106] **debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues**.52 Davis observed that **since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate** because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such **findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning**. As **Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects**."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: **Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options**. In so doing**, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed**; the **viewpoints** and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public **could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined**. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, **intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process**. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "**If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors** of the planning organizations and **bureaucracies** within which they work."56 Here, **an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science**. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship**, this type of "switch-side public** [End Page 107] **debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants**, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 **As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy**—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. **Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team** in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John **Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue**.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that **his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other**," and further, that **humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger**" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, **Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen**, respond, and form common social bonds.63 **Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry**, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) **deliberation**, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 **and (3) alliance formation**, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, **one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions**. § Marked 10:48 § Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, **such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities.** The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. **Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation**. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. **On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building**. In this vein, **Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision**. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, **Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative**. **This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities** beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas **the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"**70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. **Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments**. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 **Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances** in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. **But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.**

**b. Effective deliberation requires predictable points of stasis – its key to overcome politically debilitating self-obsession**

**Roberts-Miller 03**

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.** Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.** Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### Off 2

#### THE WORKING CLASS MUST COALESCE IN MATERIAL ACTION AGAINST FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY PLANNING. THE AFF’S NOTION OF AGENCY UNIQUELY UNDERMINES THE MATERIALIST ANTI-CAPITALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE KEY TO SURVIVAL.

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition.

The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. § Marked 10:51 § This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### Text: VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJECT THE 1AC IN FAVOR OF MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AGAINST CAPITALISM..

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem,while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!).Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. § Marked 10:52 § The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. § Marked 10:52 § The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

#### Their etymology of “black gold” is inaccurate – it is not racialized

Thomas John A Bennett and John A. Bennett.1981 “Some reflections on the terms “black and white” in English colour collocations.Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure. No. 35. Pp. 17-28

Here, too, ¶ one can see limitation of the arbitraire du ¶ signe ¶ at work, ¶ as ¶ yellow ¶ is a colour that can characterise disease and was ¶ believed, ¶ in the¶ human ¶ complexion, ¶ to show a ¶ cowardly tendency. Conversely, gold ¶ is a ¶ most valuable and desirable ¶ commodity, ¶ and ¶ anything ¶ that is ¶ comparable ¶ to ¶ it will ¶ naturally ¶ also be valued and desirable. ¶ Thus, black and white ¶ (+silver) ¶ have been examined in their colloca ¶ tions, ¶ as have ¶ yellow ¶ and ¶ gold, ¶ to see what is the ¶ general ¶ nature of the ¶ connotations that ¶ they convey. ¶ It is clear that black carries a ¶ negative charge ¶ (roughly ¶ one collocation in ¶ three) ¶ and no ¶ positive charge ¶ at ¶ all, ¶ as does ¶ yellow. ¶ On the other hand, white and ¶ gold/golden ¶ have noticeable ¶ positive ¶ connotations, though, ¶ while I found more ¶ positive meanings ¶ of ¶ gold/golden ¶ collocations than ¶ negative ones, I found twice as many negative meanings ¶ of white collocations as ¶ positive ¶ ones ¶ ; ¶ despite this, white seems ¶ clearly posi ¶ tive in tone. I ¶ interpret ¶ the black : white connotative distribution ¶ (and ¶ like ¶ wise the ¶ yellow, gold/golden distribution) ¶ not as evidence of ¶ negative preju ¶ dice ¶ among English speakers ¶ towards ¶ people ¶ or ¶ things ¶ that are black or ¶ yellow, ¶ but as an ¶ example ¶ of limitation of the arbitraire du ¶ signe. Moreover, ¶ if this were not a case of such a ¶ limitation, ¶ one would not ¶ expect ¶ to find ¶ the kind of correlation that exists between the ¶ usage ¶ of the black : white ¶ pair ¶ in ¶ English and, say, ¶ French or German. In fact, the kind of collocations ¶ examined often ¶ display ¶ what Saussure, ¶ in the Cours de ¶ linguistique g?n?rale, ¶ calls ¶ ?l'arbitraire relatif?. One can ¶ express ¶ this in a different way, by using ¶ the ¶ distinction made ¶ by Frei, ¶ in his courses at Geneva ¶ University, ¶ between the ¶ signe linguistique ¶ and the ¶ signe naturel, ¶ the former ¶ being, basically, arbitrary, ¶ while the latter is not, ¶ as it is ¶ constantly ¶ associated with a ¶ particular ¶ natural ¶ phenomenon, e.g. ¶ smoke is a ¶ sign ¶ of fire. Smoke has certain well-known ¶ attributes, ¶ one or several of which would be alluded to if I coined a meta ¶ phor ¶ such as a ¶ smoky ¶ voice. ¶ Similarly, ¶ in many ¶ of the collocations of black ¶ where ¶ negative prejudice might ¶ be felt to be ¶ expressed, ¶ one ¶ can, ¶ in ¶ fact, ¶ see ¶ a clear reference to a natural ¶ sign ¶ and its association with certain natural ¶ phenomena, ¶ i.e. blackness and its association with ¶ decomposition, disease, ¶ thunder clouds, ¶ etc. ¶ In the ¶ light ¶ of these facts it seems doubtful whether one can ¶ argue ¶ that ¶ English directly expresses negative prejudice ¶ towards black or coloured ¶ peo ¶ ple by ¶ virtue of its use of the word black in a number of collocations that ¶ have ¶ negative ¶ connotations. To ¶ argue ¶ that ¶ negative ¶ attitudes towards black ¶ people ¶ could be inculcated in children or adults ¶ by ¶ their ¶ hearing ¶ and ¶ using ¶ collocations of the kind that I have examined in this ¶ study is, ¶ to my mind, ¶ simplistic ¶ in the extreme, since § Marked 10:53 § such collocations ¶ clearly ¶ conform to the ¶ pattern ¶ of reduction of the arbitraire du ¶ signe by ¶ a reference to a natural ¶ sign¶ and this ¶ sign's ¶ connection with characteristics of a natural ¶ phenomenon (to ¶ argue ¶ that ¶ prejudice ¶ will be inculcated smacks more of ¶ political demago ¶ guery ¶ than of a concern with ¶ objective facts). ¶ It is a ¶ priori highly unlikely ¶ that a ¶ speaker ¶ of ¶ English ¶ would derive, from his ¶ knowledge ¶ of the lan ¶ guage, ¶ the ¶ impression ¶ that black ¶ people ¶ were in ¶ any way ¶ alluded to in ¶ expressions ¶ such as a black ¶ day. Indeed, ¶ it is ¶ extremely ¶ difficult to see what ¶ characteristics of black ¶ people ¶ could ¶ possible ¶ be alluded to. On the other ¶ hand, ¶ the meteorological ¶ allusion is ¶ patently obvious, ¶ and is one that ¶ any ¶ body ¶ who has ¶ experienced ¶ a thunderstorm ¶ (i.e. everyone!) ¶ would ¶ recognise ¶ immediately. Moreover, ¶ all users of a ¶ language ¶ are familiar with the mecha ¶ nisms of metaphor ¶ and of the creation of metaphors, ¶ which is an additional ¶ reason ¶ why they ¶ will not draw the wrong ¶ conclusion from ¶ expressions ¶ such ¶ as a black ¶ day ¶ or be influenced in their attitudes to black ¶ people by ¶ such ¶ expressions. Thus, ¶ since no reference is made to black ¶ people by ¶ such a ¶ collocation, ¶ it is difficult to see how it can be ¶ prejudicial ¶ to them. To ¶ argue ¶ otherwise is not ¶ only ¶ to take a rather ¶ pessimistic ¶ view of human ¶ intelligence and mental reflexes, ¶ it is to ¶ propagate ¶ a ¶ highly questionable ¶ idea.¶

# 2NC

### A2: Our Dialogue Good

**Personal expense of dialogue shuts down deliberation and makes debate useless**

**SUBOTNIK 98**

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, **the central** CRT **message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly**, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - **but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly**.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, **it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly** n75 **- destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition**. n77

[\*696] **Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others**. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If **through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, **has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences** which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, **the kinds of issues** raised by Williams **are too important** in their implications  [\*698]  for American life **to be confined to communities of color.** If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, **it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse** to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### A2: Narratives

#### Roleplaying doesn’t undermine personal agency and is more effective than focus on personal narratives which gets coopted

Alan H. Coverstone, 2005 – masters in communication from Wake Forest and longtime debate coach. “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact,” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference, 11/17/05.

However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place.¶ I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57)¶ The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency

is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism.¶ Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

# 1NR

### 2NC ETHICS IMPACT

#### CAPITALISM MAKES ETHICAL RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE.

Morgareidge ’98 (Clayton Morgareidge, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College. August 22, 1998http://legacy.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html)

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. **Under capitalism**, Marx writes, **everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money.** For those who manage and live from capital**, nothing has value of its own.** Mountain streams, clean air, **human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit**.[1] **If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products**. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, **if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced.** **Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care,** to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people**. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital**, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore **ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable.** People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. **Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.¶**

### afrocentrism – 2nc filter

#### only foregrounding materialism can adequately confront the real effects of ontologically and socially grounded racisms – the aff’s rejection of this materialism should itself be rejected.

#### WILLIAMS 2K5

[Christopher j., in defense of materialism: a critique of afrocentric ontology, PhD Candidate, Sociology, York university, institute of race relations, vol 47 1, Race and Class]

Debates about ontology are often regarded as purely academic, but, as¶ I have attempted to demonstrate, the connection between ontology,¶ paradigm formation and praxis has important consequences for life¶ beyond the ivory tower. Although there is almost nothing insightful¶ or revolutionary about the Afrocentric rejection of materialism, it is¶ profound in certain ways: profoundly untrue to the sociological concept¶ of life chances, which, in its non-bastardised form, is capable of¶ guiding critical social research; profoundly consonant with the dominant¶ view that critiques of capitalism are hopelessly wrongheaded; profoundly¶ sanguine in its assumption that far-reaching shifts in African-¶ American culture can occur while the broader structural context¶ remains unchanged; profoundly compatible with neo-conservative¶ platitudes about cultural pathology among African-Americans, and¶ so on. What is especially ironic is that some of the same people who¶ were involved in the concrete struggles of the 1960s now, as Afrocentric¶ scholars, struggle to be above the concrete, all in the name of distancing¶ their paradigm from materialism.¶ Given the harsh materiality of inadequate food, substandard¶ housing, underfunded schools, chronic unemployment, police truncheons¶ and bullets, inaccessible health care, prison cells, and so forth,¶ Afrocentricity will not speak fully to the lived experiences of people¶ of African descent until the ‘materialism and Afrocentricity do not¶ mix’ position is abandoned. Enforcing the putative purity of the paradigm¶ by espousing the view that consciousness determines being is¶ an effective boundary maintenance strategy; it keeps the materialist¶ demons at bay, but does little to challenge relations of dominance¶ structured along the axes of race, class and gender. Furthermore, the¶ impact of cultural struggle is bound to be negligible unless it occurs¶ in conjunction with struggles that are political, economic and, if necessary,¶ armed; this point has some strong affinities with Amilcar Cabral’s¶ position concerning the multiple modes of resistance that may be effectuated¶ by people working to challenge external domination.34 And,¶ finally, notwithstanding our opposition to many of the statements¶ put forth by Afrocentrists, we are in complete agreement with Ama¶ Mazama’s contention that ‘the ultimate test will be our praxis’.35 The¶ ability of this praxis to bring about a just society will be greatly¶ enhanced if the rejection of materialism is rejected.